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Russia is probing NATO with attack drones and missiles. Ignoring them is a dangerous option.
In the early hours of Sunday, Sept. 8, a Russian drone flew into Romanian airspace during a nighttime attack on Ukraine’s Danube River ports. Romania scrambled two F-16s to monitor the situation, according to the Romanian Defense Ministry. A day earlier, an Iranian-type Shahed drone armed with explosives flew from Belarus into Latvia—which is neither close to Ukraine nor on a direct flight path—and crashed near the Latvian city of Rezekne, about 35 miles from the closest section of the Belarusian border. Throughout the war, by accident or design, Russian missiles and attack drones have repeatedly infringed the airspace of Romania, Latvia, Poland, and other NATO members —and hit the alliance’s territory.
In late August, Kyiv asked European Union and NATO ministers to start shooting down Russian missiles and drones heading toward NATO over Ukraine. At first glance, this might seem like a request for NATO to step into the firing line and become a party to the war. For the Biden administration and some allied governments, becoming a direct participant in the war against Russia has been the darkest of red lines from the moment that Western intelligence services noticed Moscow’s preparations for invading Ukraine.
Establishing an air defense shield to protect NATO’s own eastern flank, however, does not translate to NATO’s entry into the war. The escalatory risk of NATO protecting its own territory can be controlled—even while a shield to head off Russian missiles and drones would have the secondary effect of providing parts of western Ukraine with much-needed air cover. Ultimately, a firm decision by NATO to act against repeated breaches of its airspace is likely to be de-escalatory. That’s because the real risk lies in letting Russia continue to test Western decision-making—and for the Kremlin to believe that it will meet no resistance when it escalates.
Ground-based air defense from various NATO member states—including Britain, France, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and other willing allies—could be deployed on the territory of Poland, Slovakia, and Romania at strategic locations along their borders with Ukraine. Allied aircraft operating in NATO airspace could also be used. The bloc would operate the shield entirely from allied territory and airspace, no weapons or troops would be placed inside Ukraine, and NATO aircraft would not enter Ukrainian airspace. The primary purpose of the air defense shield would be to prevent Russian attack drones and missiles from entering NATO airspace and hitting objects on the alliance’s territory.
Such an operation could be carried out on a bilateral basis or by a coalition of the willing. And it would not be a NATO-wide operation, given that Hungary would likely block any action by the alliance.
There have been regular instances of Russia breaching NATO airspace since the start of the invasion. Some of these incursions may well be accidental. In the first weeks of the invasion, a drone carrying explosives flew unhindered through Romanian and Hungarian airspace until it crashed next to a student dormitory in the outskirts of the Croatian capital Zagreb. In November 2022, a S-300 air-defense missile, possibly fired from Ukraine at a Russian target, went astray and killed two farmers in Poland.
But other instances do not seem so accidental. In March, a Russian missile—whose target and flight path were preprogrammed—spent 39 seconds traveling through Polish airspace before reentering Ukraine. Especially in light of deliberate Russian incursions in the Baltic Sea region and elsewhere, some of these incidents seem to be part of a systematic attempt by Russia to test NATO’s resolve and decision-making process.
This probing is dangerous and comes with a high risk of escalation. Not only could it lead to a Russian drone or missile hitting NATO territory and potentially killing civilians, but NATO would also then have to decide whether to respond to such an attack—including whether to invoke Article 5, the collective defense clause that requires the alliance to defend its members. The more that Russia probes without any NATO response, the greater the risk of an incident that would trigger Article 5.
An air defense shield to protect NATO would be a clear response to that Russian probing, with the welcome secondary effect of helping Ukraine. It would signal a more serious posture by Ukraine’s supporters and show that they are willing to regain the strategic initiative rather than merely reacting to events and drawing no red lines for Russia.
For Ukraine, the shield could help provide a degree of security along a corridor running along its western border, where drones and missiles would be engaged by the shield lest they cross into NATO territory. The depth of this corridor would depend on the types and number of air defense assets deployed. It would reduce or eliminate attacks on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure close to the border, such as the Danube ports and various electricity substations, transmission lines, and gas storage facilities.
It would also mean greater security for Ukrainian businesses and factories operating within the corridor, as well as a degree of humanitarian protection for civilians and civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals. Parts of Moldova, which is not in NATO, would fall within the corridor as well. The shield would not provide perfect protection everywhere, but it would certainly contribute more than what exists today.
A NATO air defense shield along the alliance’s eastern flank would also enable Ukraine to move some of its air defense systems from its western border closer to the front and the cities in the east, such as Dnipro and Poltava. This would strengthen Ukrainian air defense without additional systems leaving the armories of its Western allies.
The main objection to the air defense shield has been that it would prove to be escalatory by drawing NATO into direct confrontation with Russia. By shooting down Russian drones and missiles flying over Ukraine, the argument goes, NATO would become a party to the conflict and invite military retaliation by Russia, setting off a cataclysmic Russia-NATO war.
The opposite, however, is more likely to be true.
First, enforcing an air defense shield would not mean shooting down Russian fighter jets and killing Russian pilots. Russia does not fly crewed aircraft in western Ukraine precisely because of the high risk of Ukrainians shooting them down. Hence, the shield would only target uncrewed drones and missiles. For all its huffing and puffing, Moscow would be hard-pressed to make a credible case for retaliation against a country exercising its right of self-defense to shoot down a missile entering its airspace or heading in its direction.
Indeed, one could make a compelling case that NATO border states have an obligation to protect their citizens. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has stated that his and other countries have a duty to intercept Russian missiles before they enter NATO territory.
Second, an air defense shield would aim to prevent Russian missiles and drones from striking inside the territory of a NATO ally, which could trigger the Article 5 mutual defense clause. In this sense, the shield would actually be de-escalatory in averting a possible Article 5-level crisis that could quickly spiral out of control. Russia’s ability to routinely breach NATO airspace without a reaction weakens the bloc’s deterrence and raises the likelihood that Russia will probe and provoke further.
Ukraine’s partners, most notably the United States and Germany, have imposed strict caveats on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons—even including those delivered by Britain or other Western partners—and shown considerable restraint in their support for Ukraine. In their view, this cautious approach prevents escalation. But the effect has been the opposite: Not standing firm and pushing back has been an invitation for Russia to prod, provoke, and raise the stakes. Paradoxically, restraint comes with a high risk of escalation.
In showing that it will continue to push against the West if unobstructed, the Kremlin is staying true to Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin’s famous strategic adage: “You probe with bayonets: If you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw.” An air defense shield on NATO’s eastern border could provide that steel.
Would Russia retaliate against a NATO ally for intercepting a drone or missile that might strike its territory? This is highly unlikely. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly shown that he takes Article 5 seriously, and a retaliatory strike against a NATO ally could draw in the entire alliance. He will not risk wider hostilities with NATO that he knows Russia would lose.
Putin would no doubt threaten retaliation and escalation, just as he did to try to stop the West from delivering tanks, missiles, and fighter jets to Ukraine. In each case, when allies finally provided the weapons, Putin’s threats proved hollow. Strangely, Western leaders still seem not to recognize how Putin uses threats to influence Western decision-making into the direction of restraint, self-deterrence, and an overabundance of caution.
Just like in Lenin’s adage, Russia often retreats when met with force. Take the case of the Russian Black Sea Fleet: After Ukraine managed to destroy one-third of the fleet, including its flagship, the battlecruiser Moskva, Russia responded by pulling back the surviving fleet from Crimea to get out of range, rather than step up its attacks. When faced with the choice between retaliation and retreat, Russia chose retreat. Similarly, following Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk—the first foreign occupation of Russia since World War II—Putin chose to play down the incursion’s importance rather than escalate.
When the history books are written about this war, a key lesson will likely be that the seemingly prudent but overly cautious approach by the West was a signal to Russia to start and expand its war. Much of what appeared de-escalatory on the part of the West was in fact escalatory, leading to a more brutal and longer war. And much of what appeared escalatory—such as Ukraine’s attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, including with Western-provided missiles—was in fact de-escalatory.
Until decision-makers in Washington and Berlin understand this, Moscow will be pushing and probing where it can to test NATO’s resolve.
Throughout this war, the West has imposed red lines on itself. Putin has repeatedly threatened escalation and retaliation, but when tested, those threats and red lines have proved illusory. Providing an air defense shield operating from NATO territory would strengthen the alliance’s deterrence, help Ukraine, and lower the risk of escalation. It is time for Western allies to retake the strategic initiative and call Putin’s bluff.
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