While Ukraine’s surprise combined-arms incursion into the Russian oblast of Kursk gets all the headlines, Kyiv continues to carry out a parallel, deep-strike operation to target Russian vulnerabilities, with continued attacks on oil refineries and fuel depots behind the front lines.

A massive tank farm in Proletarsk, a city in Russia’s Rostov region, has been burning uncontrollably for four days after Ukrainian drones slammed into 70-odd tanks full of diesel and gasoline; by some estimates, the fire could be incinerating as much as $200 million worth of Russian fuel. Overnight on Tuesday, Ukraine launched one of its biggest attacks yet on Moscow, and although most of those drones and missiles were shot down, Ukraine did seem to start another conflagration at an oft-hit refinery in Novoshakhtinsk, also in Rostov.

So far this year, Ukraine says that it has successfully attacked more than 30 Russian oil installations, some deep inside Russia. The latest estimates are that about 17 percent of Russia’s (admittedly ample) oil-refining capacity has been damaged to some extent by the strikes. But more broadly, Russia continues to export huge volumes of oil and even a fair bit of natural gas, ensuring that oil revenues continue to fuel its war machine despite the odd million spent here and there to repair damaged crackers and condensers.

Ukraine’s pinprick assaults on Russia’s oil infrastructure, often answered with counter-battery Russian missiles aimed at vulnerable Ukrainian power plants, are part of the latest tit-for-tat energy battle in the longer-term, less violent energy war that the two countries have waged for years, especially over natural gas supplies and prices. 

In some ways, the energy fight is an adjunct to the fight on the battlefield. Ukraine’s ability to damage (even for short periods of time) Russian refineries and fuel depots is meant, in part, to undermine logistics for the Russian army, which continues to occupy large swaths of southern and eastern Ukraine. Blowing up expensive installations deep inside Russia is also a psychological boon for Ukraine, which has been largely on the back foot since early 2022. Russia’s systematic destruction of the Ukrainian electric power grid, meanwhile, is meant to undermine civilian morale and resilience ahead of winter.

The White House had initially warned Kyiv not to strike Russian oil installations, fearing Russian reprisals as well as an inconvenient spike in oil and gasoline prices ahead of the U.S. election, but Ukraine has plowed ahead regardless (just as it did with the Kursk incursion). 

The big question is: Do all the eye-grabbing explosions at refineries and fuel depots make much of a difference to Russia’s surprisingly resilient oil-based economy?

“The drones can cause economic damage an order of magnitude or higher than the cost of the drones themselves, and so yes, there is some economic damage and net benefit, cost-wise. But the damage done is brief and relatively easy to repair,” said Sergey Vakulenko, an energy expert at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Will it make drastic impacts on Russian oil revenues? Probably not. The drones cannot do what the sanctions were unable to achieve.” 

In some cases, Vakulenko said, the oil installations that Ukraine is targeting, chosen because they are within easy range of drones, may not be the critical marks that Kyiv imagines. Many of the older refineries in western Russia were built to take advantage of export customs loopholes that made it more beneficial to export barely refined oil products, even very low-quality ones, than to export regular crude. These aren’t the crown jewels, but the cracked zircons.

“The benefits of hitting those refineries may not be what the Ukrainians thought,” said Vakulenko, who was previously an oil executive at Russian and international companies. 

Like the Kursk operation, high-profile blows by Ukraine threaten to distort the view of what otherwise remains an unequal battle. If the war has come to the energy patch, it is because Russia—from nearly the beginning of the conflict—has targeted Ukrainian power installations as a deliberate part of its campaign to destroy civilian infrastructure. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, Russia targeted easy-to-hit structures, such as power transformers, that could disrupt electricity across Ukraine, especially in big cities. But that damage was relatively easy to repair, and Ukraine made it through the first winter in fairly good shape. 

At the beginning of this year, once Ukraine had homemade drones and missiles that could strike deep into Russia, thus neatly skirting both U.S. targeting prohibitions and leaky Russian air defenses, Kyiv began systematically hitting oil installations. 

In response, Moscow intensified its campaign against Ukraine’s power grid, this time using heavy missiles to go after harder-to-destroy and much-harder-to-repair power plants themselves. More than half of Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity has been blown up or seriously damaged, a huge problem heading into winter given the reliance of Ukraine’s urban heating system (and water supplies) on the power plants.

But that campaign peaked just before summer; since then, there has been a respite in the Russian vendetta against power plants. The aftershocks are still felt, though. This week, in addition to a small-scale Russian attack on power facilities just across the border in Sumy, Ukraine announced a return to rolling blackouts for many parts of the country—mostly due to increased peak power demand during the hot summer months, but clearly exacerbated by the loss of so much generation capacity, which is still a huge concern for Ukrainian officials and Western experts.

“We have not seen wide-scale attacks for six weeks or so. Russia may just be collecting missiles to attack later in the year, in October or so. As of now, there is no sign that weaponization of energy is weakening,” said Andrian Prokip, an energy expert at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute in Kyiv.

Yet the fight over refineries and power plants is just part of an even broader energy war that has aspects both of the absurd and of the absurdly normal. 

Last week, after months of feverish speculation, conspiracy theories, and finger-pointing, reporting (and a German arrest warrant) emerged that seemed to put blame for the high-profile 2023 destruction of Russia’s no-longer-operational Nord Stream gas pipeline on a band of Ukrainian freelancers. 

Meanwhile, Russian natural gas continues to transit in pipes through war-torn Ukraine, headed for customers farther west in Austria, Slovakia, and Italy. Not even Ukraine’s cross-border grab of Sudzha, the pumping station for the last trans-Ukraine pipeline, has interrupted the (limited) flows of gas moving from one belligerent state through another. 

And then there are the nuclear power plants. Since early in the war, Russia has occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Europe’s largest, in the south-central part of Ukraine. Since then, the International Atomic Energy Agency has periodically warned of concerns over the safety and security of the plant, which is now in shutdown but still potentially dangerous. Two weeks ago, a mysterious fire broke out at one of the cooling towers; a few days later, a drone explosion threatened the power supply to the facility. For years now, Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of nuclear blackmail and brinkmanship over the plant. 

Once Ukraine leapt across the Russian border, Russian media immediately warned that Ukrainian forces were seeking to capture the Kursk nuclear power plant for an apparent atomic hostage swap; most recently, Russian defenders began digging trenches around the reactors.

“The Russians have used and will continue to use the precarious state of nuclear safety at Zaporizhzhia for their own rhetorical and blackmail purposes. I suspect they may try to do the same in relation to the Kursk NPP,” said Darya Dolzikova, a research fellow of the Royal United Services Institute. 

“I see no indication that Ukraine is looking to attack the nuclear plant and the Ukrainian government has refuted any suggestions to that end,” she added. “So any Russian statements or actions to the contrary I take to be fear-mongering by Moscow.”