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The region has been mishandled by the Biden administration—and could easily become a campaign vulnerability.
As multiple crises flare, and as her Sept. 10 debate with former U.S. President Donald Trump approaches, Vice President Kamala Harris needs to anticipate a potential swipe over the Biden administration’s Balkans record. The former president has proudly cited his own record in the region, and Trump’s former Balkans special envoy, Richard Grenell, has trolled Harris on her alleged ignorance of the region. And the truth is that the situation across the Balkans, with barely an exception, has only worsened on U.S. President Joe Biden’s watch.
At a deeper level, confronting Biden’s struggles in the Balkans can help Harris to urgently refine her own foreign-policy convictions. The essential international task for any president is to wield U.S. power to advance U.S. interests.
The Biden administration’s inability to do so in the Balkans—where the West holds strategic leverage—offers a bracing, universal lesson. Discarding Biden’s core democratic principles, his State Department has “cozied up”—to use Harris’s term—to an autocrat, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Just like Trump, Biden officials have failed to grasp the unavoidable price of cutting deals with a strongman: weakness.
Emboldened by U.S. supplication, Vucic has openly revived the Greater Serbian nationalist project that led Yugoslavia to war three decades ago. Now he has applied that philosophy to his relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Both directly and indirectly, Serbia has consistently undermined each country’s sovereignty, functionality, and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
An armed Serbian plot hatched last September in the northern Kosovo town of Banjska—near where U.S. troops are deployed—sought to divide the country by force. This brazen violation of Belgrade’s peace terms with NATO could only have been executed with support from Serbian officials, none of whom have been held to account.
A U.S. administration that regularly slaps sanctions around the region has barely managed to sanction any Serbian officials. Snubbing Washington, Vucic installed two of the few U.S.-sanctioned figures in the newest Serbian government. One of them—Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, a notorious former intelligence chief and Kremlin acolyte, —met with Russian President Vladimir Putin again on Sept. 4, declaring that “Serbia is Russia’s ally” and adding that “under Aleksandar Vucic’s leadership, Serbia would never join NATO, nor would it impose sanctions on the Russian Federation.”
Vucic’s allies and rivals alike see the disparity in the U.S. posture toward Belgrade and act accordingly. In a visit to Sarajevo in late August, CIA Director William Burns confronted the “worrying secessionist rhetoric and actions” of Milorad Dodik, the pro-Russian president and government of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serb entity. For much of its tenure, the Biden administration has vainly appealed to Vucic to restrain Dodik, ignoring their shared interest in Bosnia’s demise.
In June, Vucic hosted Dodik and other nationalists in Belgrade at the openly irredentist “All Serbian Assembly.” In July, the pro-Serbian speaker of the Montenegro Parliament Andrea Mandic, orchestrated a resolution calculated to anger Croatia, an Adriatic neighbor that had fully reconciled with its onetime enemy. Executed at Serbian behest, the resolution instantly casts a shadow over Montenegro’s path to the European Union by inviting obstacles from Zagreb, which is an EU member. Like Putin, Vucic is threatened by the EU aspirations of a smaller, supposedly artificial neighbor, Montenegro, which Belgrade seeks to subjugate.
The most serious deterioration is in Kosovo, where Prime Minister Albin Kurti has infuriated Western diplomats with a series of provocative moves in the Serb-predominant north of the country. Determined to finally assert Kosovo’s sovereignty over legacy Serbian institutions, Kurti’s unilateral actions risk undoing his country’s internationally designed constitution, which guarantees a secure place for minority Serbs.
Already deflated after the Banjska fiasco, Kosovo Serbs are near the point of giving up on life in Kosovo—a result that will play into Serbian and Russian designs to undermine the Western, multiethnic order in the region.
Despite U.S. and EU sanctions, Kurti has continued his “instrumentalization” of Kosovo’s police in the north after the disastrous decision by Belgrade loyalists to march Serbs out of the Kosovo police force and other institutions in November 2022. As Grenell has noted, sharp U.S. State Department condemnations of Kurti’s actions have fallen on deaf ears.
Grenell and Biden officials are both missing the point. Kurti continues his irresponsible populism for one, counterintuitive reason: defiance of the U.S. resonates with the most pro-U.S. public in the world, Kosovar Albanians. Citizens of Kosovo, as well as many in North Macedonia and Montenegro, see Kurti as the only figure standing up to Belgrade, which has suffered no penalty for its acts or omissions that led to violent confrontation with NATO peacekeepers.
Mounting U.S. and European fury at Kurti—astride mounting U.S., French, and German investment in Serbia—only exacerbates the problem. Galvanized by Washington’s transactional leadership, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Belgrade at the end of August, sealing the sale of French fighter jets and signing an array of agreements, including in nuclear energy. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrived to fanfare in July, overseeing the signing of an EU-Serbian agreement on critical raw materials that will advance the long-stalled mining of lithium in Serbia’s Jadar Valley.
Channeling Washington, Paris insists that the arms package—which comes on top of a yearslong, disturbing weapons acquisition spree by Belgrade—will “anchor Serbia in the West.”
To the contrary, a decade of Serbian foot-dragging on EU reform has proved that Aleksandar Vucic’s ruling party is anchored in autocratic exploitation, strengthening anti-democratic rule at home, and weakening democratic neighbors in Belgrade’s own neighborhood. With his position increasingly secure, Vucic bluntly told Macron during their recent meeting that “joining the Western sanctions [on Russia] is not an option.”
Against this phlegmatic backdrop, the U.S.-backed, EU-led dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo is moribund. Neither Vucic nor Kurti will move forward with the unsigned normalization “accord” that Washington and Brussels insist both sides accepted last year. Eliminating any ambiguity, former Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic formally notified Brussels in December 2023 that Belgrade does not consider the U.S.-EU-mediated accord to be legally binding.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Putin launched in February 2022 handed Washington another golden opportunity to challenge Vucic’s duplicitous so-called balance between Serbia’s phony EU candidacy and his real friendships with the autocrats in Moscow, Beijing, and Budapest. Overwhelmed by this seismic geopolitical event, Belgrade was terrified that Washington, along with leading European capitals, would finally call Vucic’s bluff, demanding the same fidelity to the EU position on the invasion that Serbia’s fellow candidates to the bloc had shown.
Instead, the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade immediately lauded Serbia’s half-measures. By May 2022, with his confidence restored, Vucic had signed an in-your-face, three-year gas deal with Putin. In September 2022, Vucic embarrassed U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Under-Secretary of State Victoria Nuland at the United Nations, engineering the high-profile signing of a foreign-policy pact with Russia shortly after meeting the two senior U.S. officials.
The next month, Serbia signed an agreement with Hungary to build a pipeline to deliver Russian oil to Serbia, breaking Vucic’s energy commitments to Biden just as he had done to Trump. And in November, Russian state-controlled TV network Russia Today announced that it would launch its website in Serbia, in direct defiance of EU sanctions.
After initially calling for Belgrade to impose sanctions on Russia, U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill has now pronounced the U.S. government “pleased with the growing forms of cooperation between Serbia and Ukraine.”
No one in Washington should be pleased with the shortsighted, unambitious, and unnecessary trade of democratic values for autocratic disorder. Had Vucic finally been confronted with the need to give up his charade, Belgrade may have voluntarily spread Serbian military munitions to the Ukrainian battlefield without spreading Russian political ammunition throughout the region.
The proof: to this day, the Kremlin has inflicted no price on Belgrade for arming Moscow’s mortal enemy in Kyiv—not even verbal condemnation. Putin’s biggest potential threat to Vucic— ceasing Moscow’s ritual opposition to Kosovo’s membership in the U.N.—would be self-defeating. The Russian president dreams of trading Kosovo for Crimea and other Ukrainian territory in a deal at the U.N. Security Council that is sanctioned by Washington.
In short, Putin has limited options in the Balkans—which means that so does Vucic.
Free from either Russian or Western pressure, Vucic has millions of reasons to continue the highly lucrative, low-risk cash flow from arms sales that go to Ukraine. Indeed, the entire premise that Belgrade needs to be weaned from its traditional friendship with Moscow is flawed. Vucic’s alignment is ideological and voluntary, as proven by his enthusiastic alignment with non-Slavic autocrats in Beijing and Budapest. It was no coincidence that on his May European tour, Chinese President Xi Jin Ping spent most of his time in Hungary and Serbia. Flouting EU policy on Iran, Belgrade last week vowed to “expand bilateral relations” with Tehran, the strategic partner of both Beijing and Moscow. Domestically, the Serbian government enjoys near total dominance of the media narrative in the country (and sizable, poisonous influence in the wider region.)
Similarly, Belgrade’s oft-cited support for pro-Ukraine declarations and U.N. General Assembly resolutions over the war have little do with solidarity with Ukraine and everything to do with advancing Serbia’s regional agenda. As senior officials, including Vucic, have admitted, Kosovo—not Ukraine—is the reason for Belgrade’s steadfast, vocal support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
If she wants to become the U.S. president, Harris needs to understand now the peril of discarding core values just because standing up to autocrats seems like too much work. “A Europe that is whole, free, and at peace” is a stated U.S. strategic objective, not a slogan. Leaving the Balkans as a deteriorating mess is a strategic victory for the United States’ adversaries.
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